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Since the second half of the 19th century, any analysis of the epistem-
ic status of historiography has started from the observation that the 
evidentiary and explanatory standards for mathematically expressed 
theories in modern physics are not easily applied to the evaluation of 
narratives produced by professional historians. This observation gave 
rise to a philosophical puzzle that dominates the philosophy of histo-
ry: does historiography produce knowledge that is on par with scien-
tific knowledge? In his book The Philosophical Structure of Historical 
Explanation, Paul Roth turns this puzzle upside-down: historiography 
is a science, and therefore the narrative nature of historical theories is 
an epistemic aspect of scientific inquiry in general. Given this twist, 
the challenge for Roth is to produce an account of the epistemic func-
tion of narratives in historiography that is in congruence with both 
the practice of historical research and a broader epistemic account of 
scientific knowledge. 
The locus classicus for the traditional puzzle in 20th century philos-
ophy of history is Carl Hempel’s “The Function of General Laws in 
History” (1942). In this paper, Hempel explicated a basic aim of scien-
tific theories, viz. to produce general laws covering the phenomena 
that the theory targets. According to Hempel, then, if historiography 
wanted to be part of scientific inquiry, it had to aim for the formation 
of general laws covering historical events. However, since there are 
few candidates available for general laws in history, most theorists of 
historiography responded negatively to Hempel’s normative theory, 
and instead focused on the literary and narrative aspects of historio-
graphical writing. This “narrative” shift in the theory of history, most-
ly associated with the work of Hayden White (1973) and Frank An-
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kersmit (1983), subsequently led to neglecting the question of how 
historiography could fit in a broadened notion of science. Roth’s new 
book is an attempt to step away from this well-entrenched dynamic 
of the post-Hempelian debate on historiography. 
The starting point for Roth’s analysis is a central feature of histori-
cal narratives, namely their ability to describe events in terms that 
were not available at the time of the occurrence of the events. Starting 
from the work of Arthur Danto (1965), Roth focuses on the “narrative 
sentences” produced by historians, e.g. “The Thirty Years War began 
in 1618”. These sentences describe an occurrence from the past as part 
of a larger sequence of events, even though this description could not 
have been available at the time of occurrence. By structuring the rela-
tions between events, historical narratives are an essential condition 
for describing these events. According to Roth, there is no way to 
conceptualize the events independently of the narrative sequence 
which colligates them into a whole. Because historical events can only 
be described within a narrative structure, Roth defends that historical 
events have three characteristics that set them apart from the typical 
events or phenomena captured by theories in the natural sciences (11-
15). First, historical events cannot be standardized: their description 
necessarily remains open for revision in light of new occurrences. 
Second, historical events are not detachable from the narratives in 
which they operate. And third, narratives do not aggregate, in the 
sense that there is no general narrative in which all events from the 
past fit. Roth’s main example throughout the book is Raul Hilberg’s 
narrative of the Holocaust in The Destruction of the European Jews 
(1961). According to Roth, the Holocaust as a historical event is the 
result of Hilberg’s detailed narrative of what happened to Jewish 
people under the Nazi regime. The holocaust as an event to be ex-
plained by the historian, on Roth’s account, cannot be detached from 
Hilberg’s narrative that explains it. “The narrative and the explana-
tion are of a piece” (17). Narratives not only enable the description of 
historical events, they also explain them by showing the developmen-
tal process of how the events came to be.  However, this explanation 
emerges only in retrospect and only in so far as there is some human 
interest to construct them from the available evidence (21). In this re-
gard, Hilberg’s narrative constructed the holocaust as an event, and 
provided an empirically responsible and genuinely novel way to see 
the past.  
Roth’s claim that narratives both describe and explain the events 
which are its elements, is by far philosophically the most contentious 
aspect of the book. In Chapters 2 and 3, Roth takes on the task to de-
fend it. He argues that one cannot conceive a set of past events as 
elements that exist independently of a story. Any set of historical 
events necessarily entails a narrative that constitutes that set. Roth’s 
defense hinges on the claim that historical events in well-researched, 
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respectable historical work cannot be conceived of as stable kinds. 
There is no general theory of historical events as kinds prior to their 
function as elements in a historical narrative (67). Here, Roth heavily 
relies on Ian Hacking’s account of intentional kinds from The Social 
Construction of What? (Hacking, 1999). There, Hacking distinguished 
between indifferent kinds and human action kinds. Whereas the for-
mer cover things that are resilient to the way we classify them, the 
latter are bound solely by community-sanctioned descriptions used to 
characterize these kinds. As a consequence, human actions are inher-
ently open to redescription under a change of the categories of a 
community’s self-understanding. For Roth, historical events are like 
human action kinds. One can change historical events themselves by 
presenting them through an alternative narrative order. This also 
constitutes the reason why past events are necessarily indeterminate 
and can only be given in narrative form (44).  
Roth’s strategy in these chapters might appear question-begging: 
Roth assumes that historical events cannot be captured by a non-
narrative theory, through either some type of laws or some type of 
causal mechanism. From that assumption, it follows that there are no 
stable kinds of historical events that can operate independently of a 
narrative structure. However, Roth never seeks to prove that no gen-
eral theory of historical events is possible. In later chapters, Roth de-
velops a naturalist strategy to solve this problem. I.e., he aims to stay 
within the investigative practice of historiography as it is, not as some 
philosophical view of scientific knowledge would like it to be. The 
very reason why the philosophy of history in the 20th century has 
been unsatisfied with any theory of historical explanation is exactly 
the gap between the standards that such a theory entails and the 
dominant practice of historical inquiry, where narrative construction 
plays a central role. Roth’s naturalism, discussed in Chapter 7, aims to 
remove this gap.  
Roth’s analysis of narrative explanations in Chapters 1 and 4 has 
some interesting consequences—interesting, because they show how 
far removed Roth’s naturalism is from standard philosophical wis-
dom. First, Roth collapses the distinction between description and 
explanation (75). Since the descriptions of historical events cannot be 
detached from their narratives, the narratives which explain an event 
also constitute its very description. Ever since Hempel and Oppen-
heim’s “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (1948), description and 
explanation have been conceived of as two distinct aims of scientific 
knowledge. Consequently, for many philosophers of science Roth’s 
position will seem confused: one should be able to assess a historical 
theory on its descriptive and explanatory adequacy separately. How-
ever, on Roth’s view this distinction makes no sense when applied to 
historical narratives. Second, Roth’s expansion of the possible explan-
atory strategies in science entails a form of explanatory pluralism: 
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there is not one logical form appropriate to explicate all explanations. 
In order to make this expansion more plausible, Roth discusses the 
use of narrative explanations in evolutionary biology (76).  
In Chapter 4, Roth discusses a crucial worry about his narrativist 
analysis of historical knowledge, namely that historians are like fic-
tion writers who can make up events as they please. Although the 
narrativist turn in the theory of history has often highlighted similari-
ties between the construction of historical narratives and fiction writ-
ing, Roth’s analysis stays far removed from this analogy. On Roth’s 
account, historians do not produce fictions. They are empirical inves-
tigators whose narratives are held responsible to the standards of 
empirical evidence. However, historians are also responsible for the 
choice of their narratives, and this choice is not uniquely determined 
by the empirical evidence. Throughout the book, Roth emphasizes 
that multiple inconsistent narratives can conform to the same set of 
evidence. The various competing narratives of the Holocaust again 
serve as his prime example. Any evaluation to decide which narrative 
is better can only be based on a case-by-case comparison. Roth gives 
no general rules for evaluating competing narratives, no general theo-
ry for explaining the epistemic success or failure of narrative explana-
tions. The evaluation of competing narratives is left in the hands of 
the historians working on those narratives. Instead of providing a 
methodological guideline for the historian based on insights from 
epistemology, Roth’s primary aim is the articulation of a view on 
scientific knowledge that can incorporate narrative explanation. 
Perhaps the most original aspect of the book is Roth’s analysis of 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In Chapters 5 and 6, Roth 
argues that Kuhn’s innovation in the history of science was to provide 
a narrativist explanation of the progress of scientific knowledge. Roth 
aims to show that Kuhn’s notion of a scientific revolution and its ac-
companying concept of paradigm can be understood as a narrative 
explanation, i.e., articulating a sequence of events describing and ex-
plaining the transition between two different practices of empirical 
inquiry. Kuhn’s narratives of scientific change show how certain core 
beliefs in scientific communities are challenged, then disputed and 
how these disputes are eventually overcome by transitioning to a new 
paradigm. According to Roth, what science is at any point in time and 
how it evolves, can best be explained through historical narratives of 
this kind. This position is consistent with Roth’s broader naturalist 
understanding of scientific knowledge: since narrative explanation is 
an aspect of scientific inquiry, it can be used to scientifically account 
for what counts as science. Roth calls this “mutual containment”: nar-
rative explanation becomes a part of scientific inquiry because it pro-
vides our best scientific explanation of what counts as a scientific in-
quiry.  
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The Philosophical Structure of Historical Explanation is a rare attempt 
to breathe new life in a very old discussion. Its naturalist strategy is 
novel, but also philosophically extremely modest. So modest in fact 
that most philosophers of science and theorists of history will be dis-
appointed. Roth provides neither theoretical help to the working his-
torian, nor any theory of narrative explanations that could be recog-
nized as such by analytic philosophers of science. Roth highlights that 
narrative explanations share a “coherence-making strategy” with 
other forms of explanation in science, but he leaves unmentioned 
most debates on explanation from the philosophy of science. Since 
Roth’s account collapses the explanation-description distinction, it is 
difficult to assess in what sense Roth’s explication of historical expla-
nation compares to any account given by analytic philosophers of 
science so far. Narratives collate events into an order such that the 
retrospective significance of earlier events for future events becomes 
evident. Yet, how narratives can do this is left wide-open to decide by 
the practicing historians. Roth’s explication of narrative explanation 
falls short of any standards that philosophers of science have tradi-
tionally set for a theory or an account of historical explanation. Indeed, 
it is an attempt to go beyond the traditional standards set by Hempel 
and Oppenheim’s “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”. The book 
will therefore be a treasure trove for those attempting to look beyond 
the Hempelian tradition in both the philosophy of science and the 
theory of history. But it will equally seem like a profoundly unsatisfy-
ing account to anyone who wants to stay within the bounds set by 
that tradition. 
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